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Alternatives to the Fairness Doctrine:
Structural Limits Should Replace
Content Controls
by CHRISTOPHER A. HILEN*
Introduction
The Fairness Doctrine appears to be drawing its last breath,
strangled by a Federal Communications Commission (FCC or
Commission) bent on its elimination. The Commission abol-
ished the general applicability1 of the Fairness Doctrine on
August 4, 1987,2 and Congress has so far failed in attempts to
codify it.' If congressional efforts to codify the Doctrine con-
tinue to fail, Congress, the FCC and the broadcast industry
will need to examine alternatives and decide with what regu-
latory scheme, if any, they want to replace the Fairness Doc-
trine.4  Now is the time to study alternatives in a
comprehensive manner 5 and consider how they might achieve
the purposes of the Doctrine.'
The Fairness Doctrine was designed to ensure adequate and
* Member, Third Year Class. The author dedicates this Note to Sterling L.
Hilen, the first lawyer in the family, for his example and encouragement. Thanks to
Professor John Diamond for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Note,
to Eileen O'Connor for her invaluable editing, and to the other COMM/ENT editors
and members who assisted in completing this Note.
1. Particular applications of the Doctrine remain. See infra notes 89-109 and
accompanying text.
2. Syracuse Peace Council, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2 F.C.C. Rcd.
5043 (1987), qff'd sub nom. Nos. 87-1516, 87-1544, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 1475 (D.C.
Cir. Feb. 10, 1989) [hereinafter Syracuse II].
3. See infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
4. As indicated below, the FCC's action left intact certain aspects of the Doc-
trine, including the Personal Attack Rule, the Political Editorial Rule, the Zapple
Doctrine, and application of the Fairness Doctrine to ballot issues. See infra notes
89-109 and accompanying text.
5. In re Inquiry into § 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Con-
cerning Alternatives to the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast
Licensees, 2 F.C.C. Rcd. 5272 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 Fairness Report].
6. For a discussion of the purposes of the Fairness Doctrine, see infra notes
121-24 and accompanying text.
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balanced coverage of controversial issues of importance to the
community. Additional factors, including governmental intru-
sion into the first amendment rights of broadcasters, and prac-
tical workability, must be examined in conjunction with this
study of alternatives.
This Note evaluates alternatives to the Fairness Doctrine.
Section I describes the Fairness Doctrine, its development and
enforcement and the decisions of courts and the FCC which
have brought about its decline. Section III examines several
proposed alternatives to the Doctrine, evaluating each using a
"Fair Treatment Test," outlined in Section II, which evaluates
how well each alternative meets the twin goals of greater di-
versity in broadcasting for viewers or listeners and greater edi-
torial freedom for broadcasters. In Section IV, this Note
concludes that the structural approach, under which diversity
of ownership and views is pursued by severely limiting the
number of broadcast stations any individual can own, is the
best available approach.
I
Background 7
A. The Fairness Doctrine
1. Development and Requirements
The Federal Communications Commission and its predeces-
sor, the Federal Radio Commission, developed the Fairness
Doctrine through rulemaking and adjudicatory proceedings.'
7. Without governmental regulation, the first broadcasters transmitted over
whatever frequencies they chose. The number of broadcasters soon exceeded the
capacity of the radio spectrum. Competing broadcasters frequently broadcast over
the same frequency, drowning out both signals. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375-76 (1969). The infant radio industry, fearing that "the
medium would be of little use because of the cacophony of competing voices, none of
which could be clearly and predictably heard," asked the federal government to
step in and provide some regulation. See id. at 375-76 & n.4. Then Secretary of
Commerce Herbert Hoover instituted a licensing system to regulate frequencies and
hours of operation, but the Supreme Court struck down the system, holding that the
Radio Communications Act of 1912, 37 Stat. 302, did not permit enforcement. U.S. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614, 618 (N.D. Ill. 1926).
In 1927, Congress passed the Radio Act, creating the Federal Radio Commission to
license broadcasters. See Radio Act of 1927, § 4, 44 Stat. 1163. The Communications
Act of 1934, which superseded the Radio Act, established the FCC and charged it
with the responsibility of regulating the broadcast industry in the "public interest,
convenience and necessity." 47 U.S.C. §§ 303, 307(a), 309(a) (1987).
8. See, e.g., Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., 3 F.R.C. 32 (1929), rev'd on other
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The FCC first comprehensively set out the Fairness Doctrine
in a 1949 report entitled Editorializing by Broadcast Licen-
sees.' The Doctrine imposed an obligation on broadcasters to
1) provide coverage of vitally important controversial issues of
interest in the community served by the licensee, and 2) pro-
vide a reasonable opportunity for contrasting viewpoints on
such issues.10
The obligation was an affirmative one, requiring broad-
casters to search out contrasting viewpoints for broadcast." If
the broadcaster was unable to obtain paid sponsorship of a
contrasting viewpoint, the Cullman Doctrine required licen-
sees to provide one at the licensee's expense.' 2 In the Editori-
alizing decision,'3 the Commission also ended its ban on
broadcaster editorializing, 4 overruling its earlier holding in In
re Mayflower Broadcasting Co., which had prohibited the
practice. 15
2. Rationales for Fairness Doctrine
a. Scarcity Theory
For many years, the FCC justified the Fairness Doctrine by
arguing that because the airways are a scarce technological re-
source,'6 licensees have the right neither to monopolize fre-
quencies nor to broadcast only their own views.' Rather,
licensed broadcasters operate as "public trustees."' 8 Because
grounds, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1930), cert. dismissed, 281 U.S. 706 (1930); In re
Young People's Association for the Propagation of the Gospel, 6 F.C.C. 178 (1938); In
re Mayflower Broadcasting Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333 (1940).
9. In re Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949).
10. Id at para. 7.
11. Id. at para. 9; In re Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of
Controversial Issues of Public Importance, 40 F.C.C. 598, para. 9 (1964) [hereinafter
1964 Fairness Primer]; In re Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine
and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, para. 37
(1974) [hereinafter 1974 Fairness Report].
12. Letter to Cullman Broadcasting Company, Inc., 25 RAD. REG. (P&F) 895
(1963) (broadcaster ordered to accept unpaid presentation when unable to obtain
paid sponsorship for contrasting viewpoints).
13. In re Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949).
14. Id. at para. 13.
15. 8 F.C.C. 333 (1940).
16. The airwaves are unlike the print medium, where, theoretically, anyone can
buy a printing press and publish.
17. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 391 (1969). In Red Lion, the
Supreme Court relied on the scarcity theory to justify its holding that the Fairness
Doctrine did not violate the first amendment rights of broadcasters. Id. at 388-89.
18. Id at 383.
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"[ilt is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of
the broadcasters, which is paramount,"'19 government may act
to ensure that all views on controversial issues are heard over
the airwaves.2" The Fairness Doctrine was the FCC's attempt
to ensure this.
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the scarcity the-
ory as a justification for regulation of broadcasting in Telecom-
munications Research and Action Center v. FCC (TRAC).21
Further, the FCC, in abolishing the Fairness Doctrine, flatly
stated: "We do not believe that any scarcity rationale justifies
differential First Amendment treatment of print and broad-
cast media." 22
b. Impact/Passive Activity/Pervasiveness Theory
Another argument for imposing regulation on the broadcast
media is known either as the "impact theory," the "passive ac-
tivity theory," or the "pervasiveness theory." This theory
holds that "it is the immediacy and the power of broadcasting
that causes its differential treatment. '23 Chief Judge Bazelon,
described the theory as follows:
Written messages are not communicated unless they are read,
and reading requires an affirmative act. Broadcast messages,
in contrast, are "in the air." In an age of omnipresent radio,
there scarcely breathes a citizen who does not know some
part of a leading cigarette jingle by heart. Similarly, an ordi-
nary habitual television watcher can avoid these commercials
only by frequently leaving the room, changing the channel, or
doing some other such affirmative act. It is difficult to calcu-
late the subliminal impact of this pervasive propaganda,
which may be heard even if not listened to, but it may reason-
ably be thought greater than the impact of the written word.24
The Supreme Court set out its version of the impact theory
in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.25 In his majority opinion, Jus-
19. Id. at 390.
20. Id. at 394.
21. 801 F.2d 501, 508-09 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3196 (1987).
22. Syracuse II, supra note 2, at para. 73.
23. 801 F.2d at 508 (rejecting the impact theory as a justification for according
broadcasting less first amendment protection).
24. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100-01 (1968) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting) (em-
phasis in original), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
25. 438 U.S. 726 (1978), reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978) (upholding the FCC's
decision that a broadcast by comedian George Carlin was indecent and could be regu-
lated by the FCC).
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tice Stevens stated that greater regulation of broadcasting is
justified because "the broadcast media have established a
uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans. "26
Stevens found greater regulation justified because broadcast
media invade "the privacy of the home, where the individual's
right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment
rights of an intruder."2 7 Because a listener may tune in to the
middle of a program, pre-program warnings about the nature
of the program may not protect one from unexpected program
content.28 The impact theory, used in Pacifica to justify regu-
lation of indecent programming, has never been used by the
Supreme Court to justify the Fairness Doctrine, and it is un-
clear whether it provides a suitable rationale for regulating
programming that is controversial but not indecent.29
c. Public Ownership of the Airwaves Theory
Advocates of the public ownership theory argue that gov-
ernment may regulate broadcasters because the people own
the airwaves.3 0 Professor Jaffe criticized the public ownership
theory as a rationale that would never have been espoused if
technological limits had not required government regulation
to avoid interference.3 1 Professor Jaffe argues that defining
air and space, something we all use, as owned by the govern-
ment is a solecism. 2 Remarks of framers of the Radio Act of
1927 indicate that they did not base the regulation of radio on
a theory of public ownership of the airwaves.3 3
26. 438 U.S. at 748.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Telecommunications Research and Action Center v. FCC, 801 F.2d
501, 507-08 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 2196 (1987) (rejecting impact the-
ory as rationale).
30. Judge Skelly Wright advanced this argument in Business Executives' Move
for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, holding that "the airwaves are 'a limited and valuable
part of the public domain,' leased out temporarily by the federal government which
retains ultimate control over them." 450 F.2d 642, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd sub
nom. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l. Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (quoting Office of Commu-
nication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1966)).
31. Jaffe, The Editorial Responsibility of the Broadcaster: Reflections on Fair-
ness and Access, 85 HARV. L. REV. 768, 783 (1972).
32. Id.
33. See 68 CONG. REc. 2870, 2872 (1927) (remarks of Sen. Dill) ("The Govern-
ment does not own the frequencies, as we call them, or the use of frequencies. It
only possesses the right to regulate the apparatus .... We might declare that we
own all the channels, but we do not.").
1989]
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3. Application and Enforcement
The Fairness Doctrine applies "in any case in which broad-
cast facilities are used for the discussion of a controversial is-
sue of public importance. 3 4 This generally covers a television
or radio station's programming in the areas of newscasts, pub-
lic affairs, documentaries, issue advertising, 5 advertising on
ballot propositions,a6 and commentary. After briefly applying
the Doctrine to standard product advertising, the Commission
reversed itself seven years later due to complications in the
application.3 7  The Fairness Doctrine's applicability to cable
television is unclear. The Cable Communications Policy Act
of 1984 skirted the issue.3"
Historically, the first prong of the Doctrine-coverage of vi-
tally controversial issues of interest in the community served
by the licensee-was rarely enforced. In fifty years the FCC
sustained only one complaint due to broadcaster failure to
comply with the first prong. 9 Most enforcement has come
under the second prong, which requires broadcasters to pro-
vide contrasting viewpoints on controversial issues previously
aired.
The FCC does not ordinarily invoke the Fairness Doctrine
on its own motion, rather it relies on private parties to moni-
tor broadcasters' compliance and file complaints. 40 Before the
FCC will accept a complaint charging that a broadcaster is not
34. 1964 Fairness Primer, supra note 11, at 598.
35. 1974 Fairness Report, supra note 11, at para. 60.
36. Id. at para. 86.
37. The Commission applied the Fairness Doctrine to product advertising for the
first time in In re Complaint, Directed to Station WCBS-TV, ruling that the airing of
cigarette commercials raised a controversial issue of public importance. 8 F.C.C.2d
381 (1967), stay and recon. denied, 9 F.C.C.2d 921 (1967), aff'd sub nom. Banzhaf v.
FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969). The Commission's deci-
sion not to apply the Doctrine to advertisements for high-powered cars, In Re Com-
plaint by Friends of the Earth, 24 F.C.C.2d 743, 750 (1970), was reversed in Friends of
the Earth v. FCC, 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The Commission reversed its
WCBS-TV decision in the 1974 Fairness Report, supra note 11, at paras. 66-70.
38. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779
(1984).
39. Complaint of Representative Patsy Mink & O.D. Hagedorn v. Station
WHAR, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 59 F.C.C.2d 987 (1976) (West Virginia sta-
tion violated Fairness Doctrine by refusing to cover strip mining issue, which was
one of the most controversial issues of public importance at the time in the state).
40. In re The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the
Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 58 F.C.C.2d 691, para. 19 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 Reconsideration].
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meeting its Fairness Doctrine obligations, a complainant must
first ask the broadcaster to comply. 41 If the broadcaster's re-
sponse is not satisfactory, a party may then complain to the
Commission. The complaint must present prima facie evi-
dence of a violation of the Doctrine before the Commission
will forward a complaint to the licensee for its comments.
42
The Commission has turned the requirement of a prima fa-
cie case into a "formidable procedural barrier, '43 in order "[t]o
preclude the chilling effect that these insubstantial complaints
might cause. 4 4 Most complaints are dismissed with a finding
of no violation.45 Usually no sanction is imposed if the FCC
finds isolated violations during a license term. The licensee is
simply asked to make additional provision for broadcast of op-
posing views, and the violation is added to the broadcaster's
file for consideration at renewal.46 Very few licenses have
been revoked for violation of the Fairness Doctrine.47
41. Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. FCC, 717 F.2d 1471, 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
42. Id.; 1964 Fairness Primer, supra note 11, at 600; 1974 Fairness Report, supra
note 11, at para. 19; In re Complaints by Fed'n of Citizens Ass'ns of the Dist. of
Columbia & by Allen C. Phelps, 21 F.C.C.2d 12, 13 (1969); Kennedy for President
Comm. v. FCC, 636 F.2d 417, 428 n.70 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (prima facie case required
before broadcaster response necessary).
43. American Sec. Council Educ. v. FCC, 607 F.2d 438, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en
banc) (Wright, J., concurring), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980).
To establish a prima facie case, the complaint must include specific information
indicating: 1) the particular station involved; 2) the particular issue of a controver-
sial nature discussed over the air; 3) the date and time when the program was car-
ried; 4) the basis for the claim that the station has presented only one side of the
question; and 5) whether the station afforded, or has plans to afford, an opportunity
for the presentation of contrasting viewpoints. 1964 Fairness Primer, supra note 11,
at 600. See also Kennedy for President, 636 F.2d at 450-51 (lack of three require-
ments fatal to complaint).
44. Democratic Nat7 Comm., 717 F.2d at 1475.
45. By way of example, in 1973, the Commission received 2400 Fairness Doctrine
complaints; only 94 were forwarded to the licensee for comment. 1974 Fairness Re-
port, supra note 11, at para. 19. In 1973-74, of the 4,280 Fairness Doctrine complaints
received, only 19-about .4%--resulted in findings adverse to the licensee. Seven
related to the Political Editorializing Rules, 7 to the Personal Attack Rule, and 5 to
general Fairness Doctrine violations. Furthermore, only 8 of those 19 resulted in a
financial penalty. 1976 Reconsideration, supra note 40, at 709 (dissenting statement
of Commissioner Robinson). From 1982 to 1986, of the thousands of Fairness Doc-
trine complaints received by the Commission, only 24 made it to the Commission
appeals process. Bolton, In Stark Contravention of Its Purpose: F.C.C. Enforcement
of the Fairness Doctrine, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 799, 820 (1987). Of those 24, only one
resulted in a finding adverse to the licensee, and it was reversed by the Court of
Appeals. See infra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
46. 1974 Fairness Report, supra note 11, at para. 45.
47. Brandywine-Main Line Radio v. FCC, 24 F.C.C.2d 18 (1970), off'd, 473 F.2d
16 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973), was one of the few revocations
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L. J. [Vol. 11:291
The FCC traditionally gave licensees great discretion in
meeting their Fairness Doctrine obligations, imposing only a
reasonableness requirement: "In passing on any complaint in
this area, the Commission's role is not to substitute its judg-
ment for that of the licensee as to any of the above program-
ming decisions, but rather to determine whether the licensee
can be said to have acted reasonably and in good faith."48
Broadcasters need not provide an exact balance of views on
controversial issues.49 Differences of two-to-one, three-to-one,
and even four-to-one have been accepted by the Commission
as meeting the broadcaster's duty under the Doctrine.50 While
there is no mathematical formula for balance, the Commission
and the courts have held that serious imbalances violate the
Doctrine.5 The Commission refused to adopt a rigid formula
because of the concern that it would be impracticable, that it
would inhibit the discussion and presentation of controversial
issues, that it would involve the Commission too deeply in the
daily judgments of broadcasters, that it would prove in many
cases to be unreasonable, and that if a "floor" was established,
it might become the "ceiling" for treatment of opposing
views.52
4. Court Treatment of the Fairness Doctrine
In NBC v. United States, 3 the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed
to occur. But see Trinity Methodist Church, South v. FRC, 62 F.2d 850, 852 (D.C. Cir.
1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1932) (radio station's license revoked under general
public interest standard, for lack of balanced presentation).
48. 1964 Fairness Primer, supra note 11, at 599.
49. 1974 Fairness Report, supra note 11, at para. 54.
50. Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. FCC, 717 F.2d 1471, 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (fre-
quency of presentation ratio in which pro-Reagan administration views enjoyed an
advantage of approximately 3:1 on CBS and 4:1 on NBC held not to establish a prima
facia case of a Fairness Doctrine violation).
51. In re Complaint by Media Access Project, 44 F.C.C.2d 755 (1973) (news cover-
age of controversial issue on nine occasions determined insufficient to meet Fairness
Doctrine obligations when opposing views broadcast in advertising campaign "many
times"); In re Complaint of Energy Action Committee, 64 F.C.C.2d 787, para. 53
(1977) (broadcast of 53 advertisements totaling 41 minutes on one side of controver-
sial issue not balanced by total of five minutes of news reports on the issue); Public
Media Center v. KATY, 59 F.C.C.2d 494 (1976), remanded for clarification of opin-
ion and order, Public Media Center v. FCC, 587 F.2d 1322, 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(time ratios of 12:1 and 4.8:1 violate the Fairness Doctrine).
52. 1974 Fairness Report, supra note 11, at para. 43.
53. NBC v. U.S., 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (upholding FCC restrictions on chain broad-
casting practices). Chain broadcasting is defined in the Communications Act of 1934
as the "simultaneous broadcasting of an identical program by two or more stations."
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the FCC's power and duty to regulate the content of broadcast
programming: "The Act does not restrict the Commission
merely to supervision of the traffic. It puts on the Commis-
sion the burden of determining the composition of that
traffic."'
The Supreme Court upheld the Fairness Doctrine against
the claim that it violated broadcasters' first amendment rights
in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.5 The Court cited the
scarcity theory as justification for restricted first amendment
rights for broadcasters and governmental regulation of the
broadcast medium. 6 The right of the listener and viewer to
receive the widest variety of views on controversial issues out-
weighs the right of broadcasters to use their licenses to broad-
cast their private views. 7 Because of this, government may,
through the Fairness Doctrine, require a good faith effort by
broadcasters to provide both coverage of important controver-
sial issues of interest and a reasonable opportunity for con-
trasting viewpoints on such issues.58
The Court indicated that if in the future it was presented
with evidence that the Fairness Doctrine acted to reduce
rather than enhance the volume and quality of coverage,
"there will be time enough to reconsider the constitutional im-
plications" of the Doctrine.59 In 1984 the Court reiterated its
willingness to reexamine the constitutional basis of its Red
Lion holding.60
47 U.S.C. § 153 (p) (1988). The Chain Broadcasting Rules prohibit certain contract
provisions in contracts between networks and affiliate stations, including prohibiting
a station from carrying other networks' programming, 319 U.S. at 200; prohibiting
contracts exceeding two years, id, at 201-02; prohibiting a network from selling pro-
gramming to a station competing with the affiliate, id. at 200-01; prohibiting options
for a network to require its affiliate station to carry a program during certain hours,
id. at 202-04; restricting an affiliate's right to reject network programming, id at
204-06; prohibiting network ownership of more than one station in a market, id at
206-08; and prohibiting network control of an affiliate's advertisement rates, i& at
208-09.
54. 319 U.S. at 215-16.
55. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
56. Id. at 388-90.
57. Id at 390.
58. Id at 400-01.
59. Id, at 393.
60. In FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, the Court said it would
reconsider Red Lion if Congress or the FCC gave the Court some signal that techno-
logical developments have advanced so far that the scarcity rationale is obsolete. 468
U.S. 364, 376-78 nn.11-12 (1984).
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In TRAC, 1 the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that a
1959 congressional amendment to section 315 of the Communi-
cations Act 62 that created exceptions to the Equal Opportuni-
ties Rule for bona fide newscasts, bona fide news interviews,
bona fide news documentaries, and on-the-spot coverage of
bona fide news events, did not codify the Fairness Doctrine,
but merely ratified the FCC's creation of the Doctrine.63 The
FCC cited this holding as giving it authority to modify or elim-
inate the Fairness Doctrine without congressional approval."
In Syracuse Peace Council v. Television Station WTVH
(Syracuse I),6 5 the FCC determined that Television Station
WTVH of Syracuse, New York, violated the Fairness Doctrine.
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held, in Meredith
Corp. v. FCC,66 that the Commission had acted improperly in
ruling that WTVH violated the Doctrine because the Commis-
sion failed to respond to the broadcaster's constitutional chal-
lenge to the Doctrine.6 7 The court found that the Commission,
in its 1985 Fairness Report, undermined the legitimacy of the
Fairness Doctrine by casting doubts on its constitutionality 8
and remanded the case to the Commission, ordering the Com-
61. Telecommunications Research and Action Center v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501 (D.C.
Cir. 1986), cert. denied 107 S. Ct. 2196 (1987).
62. Pub. L. No. 86-274, 73 Stat. 557 (1959). Section 315(a) reads in relevant part:
Appearance by a legally qualified candidate on any-
(1) bona fide newscast,
(2) bona fide news interview,
(3) bona fide news documentary (if the appearance of the candidate is inci-
dental to the presentation of the subject or subjects covered by the news
documentary), or
(4) on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events (including but not limited
to political conventions and activities incidental thereto),
shall not be deemed to be use of a broadcasting station within the meaning
of this subsection. Nothing in the foregoing sentence shall be construed as
relieving broadcasters, in connection with the presentation of newscasts,
news interviews, news documentaries, and on-the-spot coverage of news
events, from the obligation imposed upon them under this chapter to oper-
ate in the public interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for the dis.
cussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance.
47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1987) (emphasis added).
63. 801 F.2d at 517.
64. Syracuse II, supra note 2, at para. 27.
65. 99 F.C.C.2d 1389 (1984), recon. denied, FCC No. 85-571, slip op. (released Oct.
30, 1985), remanded sub nom. Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
[hereinafter Syracuse I].
66. 809 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
67. Id. at 872-73.
68. Id. See infra note 70.
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mission to either consider Meredith Corporation's constitu-
tional challenge to the Doctrine, or decide that the Doctrine
violates the public interest standard of the Communications
Act.69
B. Elimination by the FCC
In its 1985 Fairness Report,70 the FCC found that the Fair-
ness Doctrine inhibits broadcaster coverage of controversial is-
sues of public importance 71 and causes broadcasters to provide
less effective coverage of those issues it does cover because it
"inherently provides incentives that are more favorable to the
expression of orthodox and well-established opinion with re-
spect to controversial issues than to less established view-
points. '72  Additionally, the Commission found that the
Doctrine places government in the intrusive role of scrutiniz-
ing program content 73 and creates the opportunity for govern-
ment officials to intimidate broadcasters.7 4 For these reasons,
the Commission held that the Doctrine did not serve the pub-
lic interest 75 and might be unconstitutional. 76
However, the Commission declined to eliminate the Doc-
trine because of uncertainty over whether the 1959 amend-
ment to section 315 of the Communications Act codified the
69. "[W]e remand the case to the FCC with instructions to consider Petitioner's
constitutional arguments .... The Commission need not confront... [the constitu-
tionality of the doctrine] if it concludes that in light of its Fairness Report it may not
or should not enforce the doctrine because it is contrary to the public interest." I&
at 874.
70. In re Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
Concerning the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 102
F.C.C.2d 143 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 Fairness Report].
71. Id. at para. 29.
72. The Doctrine inherently provides incentives more favorable to the expres-
sion of orthodox opinion than to less well-established viewpoints. Evidence of this is
seen in the number of broadcasters denied or threatened with denial of license re-
newal on fairness grounds, even though they had provided controversial issue pro-
gramming far in excess of the typical broadcaster. These broadcasters experienced
Fairness Doctrine challenges not because they aired controversial issue program-
ming, but because they espoused provocative opinions that many found to be abhor-
rent and extreme. Licensees, therefore, have strong incentives to stifle viewpoints
which may be unorthodox, unpopular or unestablished. Id. at paras. 69-71. See also
Syracuse II, supra note 2, at para. 45.
73. 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 70, at para. 72.
74. Id. at para. 74.
75. Id. at para. 5.
76. Id at para. 19.
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Doctrine 77 and because of Congress' strong interest in the Doc-
trine's survival.78 Instead, the Commission sent its report to
Congress and deferred action pending congressional review of
the Commission's record.79 The D.C. Circuit's holding in
TRAC, that the Fairness Doctrine was not statutorily man-
dated, ° and in Meredith Corp. v. FCC, ordering the Commis-
sion to consider the constitutionality of the Doctrine,
eliminated these roadblocks, and the FCC abolished the Fair-
ness Doctrine on August 4, 1987.1
In eliminating the Fairness Doctrine, the FCC relied on the
findings in its 1985 Fairness Report. The Commission also
found the scarcity rationale for the Doctrine obsolete due to
the increase in broadcast, cable, satellite, and other technolo-
gies since the Red Lion decision in 1969.2
C. Court Challenge to FCC Abolition of the Fairness Doctrine
The Commission's repeal of the Doctrine was appealed by
the Syracuse Peace Council. The challengers argued that, con-
trary to the TRAC decision, the Doctrine was mandated by sec-
tion 315 of the Communications Act, and the FCC had neither
the power to repeal it nor an adequate record to do so. The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia recently
rejected the challenge, holding that the Commission's determi-
nation that the Doctrine did not serve the public interest was
supported by its record in the proceeding.8 3 The court refused
to reach the Commission's finding that the Doctrine was
unconstitutional.8 4
D. Congressional Codification Efforts
Congress attempted to enact the Fairness Doctrine on June
3, 1987,85 but was unable to override President Reagan's veto. 6
77. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
78. 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 70, at para. 176.
79. Id. at para. 181.
80. 801 F.2d 501, 517 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
81. Syracuse II, supra note 2, at para. 61.
82. Id. at para. 73.
83. Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, Nos. 87-1516, 87-1544, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS
1475 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 10, 1989).
84. Id,
85. S. 742 was passed by the Senate on April 21, 1987, and H.R. 1934 was passed
by the House of Representatives on June 3, 1987.
86. The President vetoed S. 742 on June 19, 1987. 23 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
715 (June 29, 1987). On June 23, 1987, the Senate voted to return the bill to commit-
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Subsequent congressional efforts to include the Doctrine in a
$600 million appropriations bill (continuing resolution needed
to keep the government operating) signed by the President
December 22, 1987, also failed.8 7  Congressional attempts to
codify the Fairness Doctrine are expected to continue.8s
E. Current State of Affairs
The Commission's decision in Syracuse I189 did not elimi-
nate every application of the Fairness Doctrine:9° "we need
not-and do not-decide here what effect today's ruling will
have on every conceivable application of the Fairness Doc-
trine."91 The ruling does not affect the responsibility of broad-
casters to comply with statutory requirements such as the
Reasonable Access92 and Equal Opportunity93 provisions of the
Communications Act. The FCC's action also left intact, for
the time being, certain portions of the Fairness Doctrine,94 in-
tee without attempting to override the veto. 133 CONG. REC. S8438 (daily ed. June
23, 1987).
87. The House version of the continuing resolution contained the Doctrine,
while the Senate deleted it from its version. In conference, the House and Senate
conferees reached stalemate, with Senate opponents threatening to filibuster, while
the President threatened to veto the entire spending bill and keep Congress in
Washington, D.C. over Christmas if the Doctrine was kept in the bill. In a late night
session on December 21, the House finally receded from its position to the Senate
position by a voice vote, dropping the Doctrine from the bill. The President Stands
Firm, BROADCASTING, Dec. 28, 1987, at 32.
88. kI. at 31 (statements of Senator Ernest Hollings and Congressman Ed
Markey).
89. Supra note 2.
90. Letter from Commissioner Dennis R. Patrick to Congressman John D.
Dingell (Sept. 22, 1987) (discussing enforcement of the Fairness Doctrine) [hereinaf-
ter Patrick Letter].
91. Syracuse I, supra note 2, at 5043 n.75.
92. The Reasonable Access Rule requires broadcasters to sell reasonable
amounts of time to candidates for federal office. Under the Reasonable Access Rule,
a broadcaster cannot refuse to sell any time to federal candidates. 47 U.S.C.
§ 312(a)(7) (1987). See also CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
93. Under the Equal Opportunities Doctrine, if a broadcaster provides time to a
candidate, it must provide the candidate's opponents the opportunity to obtain
broadcast time under the same conditions. The candidate seeking time must be a
legally qualified candidate opposing the first candidate in a particular election. The
broadcaster must provide the same rate and essentially the same time. Section 315
applies only to appearances by candidates and not to appearances by supporters or
candidate spokespersons. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1987). See also In re Request by Adrien
Weiss, 58 F.C.C.2d 342 (1976) (broadcast of movies starring Ronald Reagan consti-
tutes a use within § 315(a), triggering Equal Opportunities Doctrine).
94. Patrick Letter, supra note 90.
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cluding the Personal Attack Rule,95 the Political Editorial
Rules,' the Zapple Doctrine,97 the Cullman Doctrine,9 s and
application of the Fairness Doctrine to ballot issues.9 Also
unchanged are the FCC's other content rules, such as issue re-
sponsive programming,"° prime time access, 10' and the FCC's
ability to license and regulate in the public interest. 02
Despite the limited scope of Syracuse II, it was, neverthe-
less, a watershed decision, probably presaging FCC elimination
of most, if not all, of the Fairness Doctrine rules.0 3 Although
the remaining portions of the Doctrine contain its most often
enforced portions, the current Commission will probably not
enforce them without congressional action. Accordingly,
broadcasters are no longer compelled by the FCC to provide
coverage of vitally important controversial issues of interest to
the community served by the licensee, or to provide a reason-
95. If a broadcast attacks the personal qualities of an identified person or group
in the context of a controversial issue of public importance, the Personal Attack
Rule requires the broadcaster to notify the attacked person or group, provide them
with a transcript, copy, recording or summary of the broadcast, and afford them, an
opportunity to respond. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1920 (1986). See also Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 373-75 (1969).
96. The Political Editorial Rule requires that when a licensee endorses or op-
poses a legally qualified candidate in an editorial, the licensee must send the other
candidate(s) for the same office, or the candidate(s) opposed in the editorial, a script
or tape of the editorial within 24 hours, and the station must offer a reasonable op-
portunity for the candidate or a spokesperson to respond over the licensee's facili-
ties. Where such an editorial is broadcast within 72 hours prior to the election, the
licensee must notify the respective candidate(s) ahead of time to enable the candi-
date(s) to respond before the election. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1930 (1986).
97. The Zapple Doctrine requires that when supporters of a candidate buy time
and broadcast a discussion of the candidates or the campaign issues, it is unreasona-
ble for the licensee to refuse to sell comparable time to supporters of an opposition
candidate. Letter from Dean Burch, Chairman of the Commission, to Nicholas Zap-
ple, 23 F.C.C.2d 707 (1970).
98. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
99. See Public Media Center v. FCC, 587 F.2d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (applying
Fairness Doctrine to ballot measure advertising).
100. See infra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
101. The Prime Time Access Rules prohibit licensees from obtaining more than
three hours of their 7-11 p.m. prime time programming from the networks. Limited
exceptions are provided for children's programming, special news events, political
broadcasts, and specific sporting events, such as the Olympics and New Year's Day
college football games. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(k) (1987).
102. Fairness Held Unfair, BROADCASTING, Aug. 10, 1987, at 30 (comments of FCC
General Counsel Diane Killory).
103. President George Bush's reported support of President Reagan's veto of Fair-
ness Doctrine codification indicates that the dismantling of the Doctrine is likely to
continue. Reregulation, Deregulation, and the Future of Communications Policy,
BROADCASTING, Nov. 21, 1988, at 56.
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able opportunity for contrasting viewpoints on controversial
issues which are covered. 10 4
While the Fairness Doctrine is on its way out, the public in-
terest standard of the Communications Act remains, and the
FCC has indicated its intent to continue to regulate broadcast-
ing in the public interest.10 5 One of the Commission's stated
reasons for eliminating the Doctrine was that the Doctrine vi-
olated the public interest.1°6
The public interest standard no longer requires formal as-
certainment requirements to determine a community's broad-
casting needs; they were eliminated by the Commission when
it deregulated radio and television. 107 Broadcasters, however,
must still provide programming that is responsive to commu-
nity needs, 08 a requirement that dovetails with prong one of
the Doctrine requiring broadcasters to provide coverage of
controversial issues of importance to the community.10 9
104. It is too soon to tell if broadcasters are changing their programming as a
result of the elimination of the Fairness Doctrine. Should congressional codification
efforts fail, this is certain to be an area of study by interested parties.
105. Syracuse II, supra note 2, at para. 81.
106. The Commission stated in its 1985 Fairness Report that the Doctrine violated
the public interest for several reasons: the public has "access to a multitude of view-
points without the need or danger of regulatory intervention," supra note 70, at
para. 138; "in stark contravention of its purpose, [the Doctrine] operates as a perva-
sive and significant impediment to the broadcasting of controversial issues of public
importance," id. at para. 42; and enforcement of the Doctrine inhibits the expression
of unpopular opinion, id. at paras. 69-71, places the government in the intrusive role
of scrutinizing program content, id. at paras. 72-73, creates the opportunity for abuse
for partisan political purposes, id. at paras. 74-76, and imposes unnecessary costs
upon both broadcasters and the Commission, id. at paras. 77-80.
107. In the Matter of the Revision of Programming and Commercialization Poli-
cies, Ascertainment Requirements, and Program Log Requirements for Commercial
Television Stations, Report and Order, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076, paras. 45-54 (1984), recon.
denied, 104 F.C.C.2d 358 (1986), remanded on other grounds sub noma. Action for
Children's Television v. FCC, 821 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1987) [hereinafter Television
Deregulation]; In re Deregulation of Radio, Report and Order, 84 F.C.C.2d 968, paras.
55-72 (1981), recon. denied 87 F.C.C.2d 797 (1981), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) [hereinafter Radio Deregulation].
108. As part of its mandate to regulate the broadcasting industry in the public
interest, the FCC requires broadcasters to familiarize themselves with the needs,
interests and problems of the groups comprising the community proposed to be
served, to document such familiarity in license applications, and to provide program-
ming which is responsive to those needs. See Television Deregulation, supra note
107, at para. 24; Radio Deregulation, supra note 107, at para. 34. While abolishing the
Fairness Doctrine, the Commission held that broadcasters' duty to provide issue re-
sponsive programming remains. Syracuse II, supra note 2, at para. 34.
109. Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council v. WTVH, 3 F.C.C. Rcd. 2035, para. 27
(1988) [hereinafter Syracuse III]; Syracuse II, supra note 2, at para. 34.
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II
Test for Analyzing Alternatives
The Communications Act of 1934 requires licensees to
broadcast in the public interest.110 Although the broadcaster
has first amendment rights, those rights have been
subordinated to those of the receiver, and the broadcaster is
not free from governmental intrusion into its editorial pro-
cess.111 The Supreme Court long ago stated that "[i]t would be
strange indeed . . . if the grave concern for freedom of the
press which prompted adoption of the First Amendment
should be read as a command that the government was with-
out power to protect that freedom .... Freedom to publish
means freedom for all and not for some.' 12
The listener's right to receive diverse views does not, how-
ever, imply a corresponding right of any particular viewer to
have access to the airwaves to broadcast his or her own partic-
ular program.11 3  Rather, the broadcaster must ensure,
through its overall programming, broadcast of a rough balance
of coverage on controversial issues.1 4 Since no individual
viewer can demand access to a station to broadcast his or her
contrasting views on a controversial issue, the broadcaster re-
tains the editorial discretion to choose how to meet its Fair-
ness Doctrine obligations.115
The Fairness Doctrine is neither constitutionally nor statu-
torily mandated. Rather, it is "a means of ensuring the attain-
ment of first amendment objectives,' 1 6 and controversy has
centered not on whether broadcasters should enjoy first
amendment rights, but on the definition of the relative rights
of the viewer and the broadcaster.
110. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1987).
111. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948).
112. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
113. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 113 (1973); Letter from Ben F.
Waple, Secretary, to Madalyn Murray, 40 F.C.C. 647, 647-48 (1965) [hereinafter
Madalyn Murray]; In re Complaint of Democratic State Cent. Comm. of Cal., 19
F.C.C.2d 833, 834 (1968); Complaint by Boalt Hall Student Ass'n v. KPIX, 20
F.C.C.2d 612, para. 7 (1969); Branch v. FCC, 824 F.2d 37, 50 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
114. In re Complaint of Margaret L. Scherbina, 21 F.C.C.2d 141, 143 (1969).
115. CBS, 412 U.S. at 113; Madalyn Murray, supra note 113, at 647-48; Democratic
State Cent. Comm. of Cal., 19 F.C.C.2d at 834; Boalt Hall Student Ass'n, 20 F.C.C.2d
at para. 7.
116. Inquiry into the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licen-
sees, Notice of Inquiry, Gen. Docket No. 84-282, 49 Fed. Reg. 20,317, 20,318 (released
May 8, 1984) [hereinafter 1984 Notice of Inquiry].
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Up to now, the Supreme Court has approved the Fairness
Doctrine as a reasonable intrusion into broadcasters' first
amendment rights, necessitated by the public's right to an
"uninhibited marketplace of ideas. ' 117 The Court has stated,
however, in both Red Lion and League of Women Voters, its
willingness to reconsider the Doctrine,1 " but not "without
some signal from Congress or the FCC that technological de-
velopments have advanced so far that some revision of the sys-
tem of broadcast regulation may be required.""' 9
Since Red Lion, the Supreme Court, by approving the Fair-
ness Doctrine, approved a regulation which, as enforced, pro-
tected viewers' first amendment rights at the expense of
broadcasters' first amendment rights. With the abolition of
the Fairness Doctrine, an opportunity now exists to examine
alternatives to determine the extent to which each also pro-
vides first amendment protection to broadcasters.120 An exam-
ination of the purpose of the Fairness Doctrine and its
application by the FCC and the courts reveals an attempt to
weigh the rights of the audience and the broadcaster equally
and to maximize both.
The Doctrine has been described as intended to ensure "the
widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources. "121 The Commission has stated, "[i]t is
this right of the public to be informed, rather than any right
on the part of the Government, any broadcast licensee or any
individual member of the public to broadcast his own particu-
lar views on any matter, which is the foundation stone of the
American system of broadcasting.' ' 22
"The purpose and foundation of the Fairness Doctrine is
therefore that of the first amendment itself: 'To preserve an
uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will
117. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
118. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
119. Id. See also FCC v. League-of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376 n.11 (1984).
120. Red Lion provides a constitutional mandate that viewers' first amendment
rights are paramount over broadcasters' first amendment rights. However, the
Court's and the Commission's policy of encouraging greater coverage of controversial
issues of public importance provides a policy mandate for protection of broadcasters'
first amendment rights. Given the Court's hints in Red Lion and League of Women
Voters, it is possible that the policy mandate for full first amendment rights for
broadcasters will one day become a constitutional one.
121. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
122. 1964 Fairness Primer, supra note 11, at 600 (quoting In re Editorializing by
Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, para. 6 (1949)).
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ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization
of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a
private licensee.' "123 Clearly, any alternative must meet "the
goal of the Fairness Doctrine [which] is to inform the
public." 2 4
On the other hand, the Commission and the courts have
been reluctant to violate the first amendment rights of broad-
casters in applying and enforcing the Doctrine. The Commis-
sion has held that "[i]n passing on any complaint in this area,
the Commission's role is not to substitute its judgment for that
of the licensee as to any of the above programming decisions,
but rather to determine whether the licensee can be said to
have acted reasonably and in good faith."' 25 The Commission
repeated its support for such a limited inquiry in its 1974 Re-
port: "In reviewing the adequacy of the amount of a licensee's
public issue programming, we will, of course, limit our inquiry
to a determination of its reasonableness. 126 The Commission
has sought to give broadcasters wide latitude in meeting their
Fairness Doctrine obligations: "We wish to emphasize that the
responsibility for the selection of program material is that of
the individual licensee. "127
The Supreme Court has also recognized the dangers of gov-
ernmental censorship and the need for the FCC to tread
lightly in enforcing the Doctrine. In CBS v. Democratic Na-
tional Committee, the Court held that "Congress appears to
have concluded.., that of these two choices-private or offi-
cial censorship--Government censorship would be the most
123. 1974 Fairness Report, supra note 11, at para. 11 (quoting Red Lion, 395 U.S.
at 390). See also 1964 Fairness Primer, supra note 11, at 604, para. 8 ("The keystone
of the fairness doctrine and of the public interest is the right of the public to be
informed-to have presented to it the 'conflicting views of issues of public impor-
tance.' ") (quoting Letter to Cullman Broadcasting Co., Inc., 25 RAD. REG. (P&F) 895
(1963)). 1974 Fairness Report, supra note 11, at para. 1 ("to foster 'uninhibited, ro-
bust, wide-open' debate on public issues") (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)); 1974 Fairness Report, supra note 11, at para. 1 (and further
that "any promotion ... must be compatible with the public interest in 'the larger
more effective use of radio.' ") (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) (1987)).
124. In re The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the
Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, Report and Order, 74
F.C.C.2d 163, para. 27 (1979) [hereinafter 1979 Remand].
125. 1964 Fairness Primer, supra note 11, at 599.
126. 1974 Fairness Report, supra note 11, at para. 24.
127. Id. at para. 26. "In developing and implementing the fairness doctrine, it has
never been our intention to force licensees to conform to any single, preconceived
notion of what constitutes the 'ideal' in broadcast journalism." Id. at para. 21.
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pervasive, the most self-serving, the most difficult to restrain
and hence the one most to be avoided. '128
Examination of the purposes and enforcement of the Doc-
trine as outlined above yields a two-part "Fair Treatment
Test" for possible alternatives: 1) Does the alternative ensure
that viewers and listeners will have access to a wide variety of
viewpoints on a wide variety of controversial issues of impor-
tance to the community?, and 2) Does the alternative ensure
that the broadcaster will maintain editorial discretion, pre-
cluding the government from telling the licensee what to
broadcast?
An alternative satisfying both these goals is possible if cer-
tain factors are taken into account. These factors include
the current state and future growth of the communications
media, including broadcasting, cablecasting, 12 9 new broadcast
technologies such as low power television (LPTV),'3 0 multi-
point distribution service (MDS) and multichannel multipoint
distribution service (MMDS),3 1  satellite master antenna
128. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 105 (1973).
129. Cable television systems receive television, radio, or other electronic signals
by antennae, including satellite and microwave transmissions. They may also gener-
ate their own signals and transmit them via microwave or coaxial cable to a
headend. At the headend, the signals are processed, amplified and fed into a distri-
bution path consisting of coaxial trunk lines, feeder cables, and drop cables. The
distribution path carries the cable signal to recipients. D. BRENNER & M. PRICE,
CABLE TELEVISION AND OTHER NONBROADCAST VIDEO: LAW AND POLICY § 1.03
(1986). As of 1985, cable television was available to more than 73 million of the 84
million television households, and close to 29 million homes subscribed to basic cable
service. See 1984 Notice of Inquiry, supra note 116, at para. 37. As of 1988, over 50%
of American homes subscribed to basic cable service. By the Numbers, BROADCAST-
ING, Sept. 19, 1988, at 14.
130. Low power television (LPTV) is an over-the-air service limited to 10 watts
for VHF and 1,000 watts for UHF. LPTV stations were originally known as transla-
tors because they were only permitted to rebroadcast signals from full-service sta-
tions. They have principally served rural areas. In 1982 the FCC authorized them to
originate programming. See Low Power Television Service, 47 Fed. Reg. 21,468
(1982). They are less expensive to operate than conventional broadcast stations and
are expected to serve areas with a limited number of television signals or communi-
ties which have been underserved in the past. 1984 Notice of Inquiry, supra note
116, at para. 41.
131. Multipoint distribution service (MDS) and multichannel multipoint distribu-
tion service (MMDS) are common carrier services used primarily to provide sub-
scription programming to consumers via microwave transmissions. MDS service
became available in 1974 and, as of 1985, served approximately 530,000 subscribers
out of a potential subscriber base of over 15 million. 1984 Notice of Inquiry, supra
note 116, at para. 39.
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service (SMATV),'3 2 subscription television (STV),'13 3 direct
broadcast satellite (DBS), 3 4 instructional television fixed ser-
vice stations (ITFS), videotext and teletext,'3 5 and print media.
Advocates of broadcast regulation have often made the mis-
take of treating each type of media service in a vacuum, appar-
ently assuming that anyone who watches television ignores
radio, newspapers, magazines and other information services.
While a majority of Americans apparently get most of their
information from a single medium-television-they do not ig-
nore the other media.3 6 It is similarly erroneous to assume
that individuals rely on a single outlet or source within a par-
ticular medium.
Former FCC Chairman Charles Ferris and L. Gregory
Ballard argue that the number of television stations should be
compared not just with national newspapers, but with the
entire print medium, including dailies, weeklies, locals,
132. Satellite master antenna television (SMATV) systems broadcast via satellite
transmissions to multiple dwelling units through the use of antenna systems, includ-
ing satellite earth stations installed on buildings, that gather programming which is
then fed to the building's occupants by cable. Id. at para. 40.
133. Subscription television broadcasting (STV) consists of a scrambled broadcast
signal that is made available to those who pay for decoders. As of 1985 there were 19
STV stations serving approximately one million subscribers. Id. at para. 39.
134. Direct broadcast satellite service (DBS) systems can transmit entertainment,
news and information services, including teletext, from high-powered satellites on
the Ku satellite band directly to inexpensive home receivers, cable systems, conven-
tional and low power television broadcast stations, and other land-based communica-
tions facilities. They were authorized by the FCC in 1982. See Direct Broadcast
Satellite Service, 90 F.C.C.2d 676, para. 1 (1982); Satellite Television Corp., 91
F.C.C.2d 953, para. 1 (1982); CBS, Inc. et al., 92 F.C.C.2d 64, para. 3 (1982). There are
estimated to be over one million DBS subscribers, with estimated growth of 40,000-
80,000 per month. See also 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 70, at para. 118.
135. Videotext and teletext combine elements of both electronic and print media
by enabling television broadcast stations, cable systems, or telephone systems to
transmit textual or graphic information for display on video monitors. These sys-
tems can offer a wide range of information, including news, weather, and consumer
advice, which can be continuously updated. Teletext is a one-way system, while
videotext systems have two-way capabilities allowing consumers to transact business
with banks or stores and engage in electronic messaging. They are expected to be-
come commonplace in the future. See 1984 Notice of Inquiry, supra note 116, at
para. 42.
136. Sixty-six percent of Americans use TV as their primary source of news. A
Short Course in Broadcasting, 1988, BROADCASTING/CABLECASTING YEARBOOK, at A-
2 (1988) (citing a 1987 study which concluded that 66% of Americans mention televi-
sion as their main news source, compared to 36% who cite newspapers, 14% who cite
radio, and 4% who cite magazines. TIO/ROPER, AMERICA'S WATCHING: PUBLIC AtrI-
TUDES TOWARD TELEVISION 4 (1987)). The networks' share of television viewers has
fallen from 90% of television homes to 75%. Ratings Down 10%, Share Off Four
Points, BROADCASTING, Nov. 9, 1987, at 35.
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magazines, newsletters, trade journals and books." 7 In that
case, the nation's approximately 1,750 television and low
power television stations are dwarfed by the thousands of
print outlets. 13  However, if all print media are to be grouped
together for comparison with broadcasting, television should
logically be grouped with radio, cable, and all other nonbroad-
cast video.'3 9
Ferris' grouping is structural rather than functional. Broad-
cast stations with daily news and information programs are
functionally more akin to daily newspapers than are weekly
newspapers, semiweekly newspapers, and periodicals. Pro-
fessor Donald Lively contends that the media, despite their
structural differences, are functionally similar and should,
therefore, be considered as a whole.140
137. Ferris & Ballard, Independent Political Action Groups: New Life for the
Fairness Doctrine, 36 VAND. L. REV. 929, 934 (1983).
138. The print media consist of 9,031 newspapers (1,646 dailies, 6,750 weeklies, 510
semiweeklies) and 11,593 periodicals (including 1,400 weeklies, 858 semimonthlies,
4,031 monthlies, 1,402 bimonthlies, and 1,984 quarterlies). BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1988, 528,
at chart No. 891 (108th ed. 1988).
By way of comparison, the number of radio and television stations and cable oper-
ators transmitting as of 1987 was as follows:
Commercial AM Radio 4,915
Commercial FM Radio 4,116
Educational FM Radio 1,356
Total Radio 10,387
Commercial VHF TV 543
Commercial UHF TV 506
Educational VHF TV 119
Educational UHF TV 214
Total TV 1,382
VHF Low Power TV 109
UHF Low Power TV 290
Total Low Power TV 399
Cable
47,042,000 Total Subscribers
73,900,000 Homes Passed
8,000 Total Systems
52.8% Household Penetration
32% Pay Cable Penetration
By the Numbers, BROADCASTING, Nov. 28, 1988, at 12.
139. See supra notes 129-35 and accompanying text.
140. Lively, Deregulatory Illusions and Broadcasting: The First Amendment's En-
during Forked Tongue, 66 N.C.L. REV. 963, 974 (1988).
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III
Alternatives to the Fairness Doctrine
What follows is not a list of all possible alternatives to the
Fairness Doctrine.' 4 ' However, it does include most of the ma-
jor proposals that the FCC and Congress have considered dur-
ing the last 25 years. Some involve only modifications of the
Fairness Doctrine, while others represent complete departures
from the current system of broadcast regulation. 142
Applying the Fair Treatment Test first to the recently
discarded Fairness Doctrine, one can see that the Doctrine
maximized neither the viewer's nor the broadcaster's first
amendment rights. Compliance with the second prong of the
Doctrine, including litigating complaints in which the broad-
caster eventually prevailed, imposed heavy costs on broadcast-
ers. 4 3 In order to avoid these high costs, many broadcasters
limited the amount of controversial issue programming to the
minimum required by the first prong (its obligation to cover
controversial issues of vital importance to the community).144
The result was that viewers were deprived of a wide variety of
views on such issues. The Doctrine, therefore, fails part one of
the Fair Treatment Test.
The FCC's power under the Fairness Doctrine to determine
whether a broadcaster's controversial issue programming was
balanced and to order broadcasters to provide additional pro-
gramming resulted in the FCC second-guessing the editorial
decisions of broadcasters. 45 Thus, the Doctrine fails the sec-
141. Others include keeping the Fairness Doctrine but abandoning the case by
case enforcement approach in favor of enforcement at license renewal time under a
malice standard, and requiring deliberate violation of the Doctrine or a pattern of
acting in reckless disregard of the Doctrine in order to deny renewal of the license.
See 1987 Fairness Report, supra note 5, at paras. 36-40. A related proposal is to aban-
don the case by case enforcement approach in favor of an overall review of the licen-
see's record at renewal time. See id. at paras. 41-53. Because these proposals retain
the Fairness Doctrine, they will not be discussed in this Note. Alternatively, some
have advocated imposing broadcast-like regulations on the print media. See, e.g.,
Spitzer, Controlling the Content of Print and Broadcast, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1349,
1353 (1985). This proposal raises a host of additional constitutional issues which are
beyond the scope of this Note.
142. Many were considered by the FCC in its 1987 Fairness Report, supra note 5.
143. Syracuse II, supra note 2, at para. 43; 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 70, at
para. 41.
144. Syracuse II, supra note 2, at para. 43; 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 70, at
para. 46.
145. 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 70, at para. 72.
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ond part of the Test; it encroaches on broadcasters' editorial
discretion by allowing a government agency to tell the licensee
what to broadcast. 146 Such action steps dangerously close to
censorship, prohibited by section 326 of the Communications
Act. 1
47
A. Alternative One: Mandatory Access
Under the mandatory access alternative, broadcasters would
be required to set aside a discrete period of time for regular
discussion of controversial public issues by interested par-
ties. 48 A mandatory access plan could provide either free or
paid access. A variety of access schemes have been proposed
over the years.
Professor Barron advocated recognizing a first amendment
right to mandatory access to all media.149 Professor Bollinger
argued that legislative access regulations should be applied to
one segment of the media to assure achievement of first
amendment goals.' °
The Federal Trade Commission in 1974 proposed a right of
access to respond to four categories of commercial announce-
ments, including 1) those advertisements that explicitly raise
controversial issues; 2) those that raise controversial issues im-
plicitly; 3) those that make claims based on scientific premises
that are in dispute; and 4) those that are silent about negative
aspects of the advertised products.'15
146. Lucas A. Powe provides examples of Presidents Roosevelt, Eisenhower, Ken-
nedy, and Nixon using the FCC to pressure broadcasters. L. POWE, AMERICAN
BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 68-74, 75-84, 113-14, 121-41 (1987).
147. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1987) states:
Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the Com-
mission the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals
transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be
promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with the
right of free speech by means of radio communication.
148. In order to be a true alternative to the Fairness Doctrine, such a plan should
be structured to substitute for, rather than to supplement, Fairness Doctrine obliga-
tions. As the FCC stated in its 1987 Fairness Report: "Those access proposals that
would serve as a supplement to the fairness doctrine do not represent acceptable
alternatives to the doctrine since they would not relieve broadcasters of their ex-
isting fairness doctrine obligations, butinstead would result in further burdens and
government oversight for broadcasters." Supra note 5, at para. 88.
149. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right 80 HARv. L.
REV. 1641, 1666 (1967).
150. Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Par-
tial Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1976).
151. 1974 Fairness Report, supra note 11, at para. 71.
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In 1974 and 1976, the Committee for an Open Media (COM)
offered a proposal for access through "Free Speech Messages"
as a supplement to a licensee's Fairness Doctrine obliga-
tions.152 Under the COM proposal, publicly available spot
messages would be broadcast at different times during the
week." 3 Half the spots would be available on a first-come-
first-served basis, and the other half would be rotated among
representative spokespersons from groups that have demon-
strated significant community support.5 The plan was of-
fered as an optional method for broadcasters to meet their
Fairness Doctrine obligations. The Commission praised it as a
serious attempt to meet the Commission's requirements for an
access system 155 but, nevertheless, rejected the proposal as not
perfected nor ready for adoption as a rule or policy. 156
In 1979, Henry Geller, Director of the Washington Center
for Public Policy Research at Duke University, suggested a
"Ten Issue" requirement for television licensees as a supple-
ment to the Fairness Doctrine.'57 In 1987, similar proposals
for access as a supplement to Fairness Doctrine obligations
were made by Geller and Donna Lampert, 5 " the Telecommu-
nications Research and Action Center, and the New York
Consumer Protection Board. 59  The Commission has con-
sistently rejected mandatory access as a substitute for the
Fairness Doctrine.6 °
Mandatory access offers several advantages. It would re-
152. 1976 Reconsideration, supra note 40, at para. 7.
153. Id
154. Id.
155. These include maintaining licensee discretion, providing no right of access to
particular persons or groups, ensuring that important issues not escape timely public
discussion, and not drawing the government into the role of deciding who gets onto
the air. Id. at para. 32.
156. Id. at para. 33.
157. The "Ten Issue" requirement would require a licensee to list annually the
ten community and national controversial issues of public importance which it chose
for the most coverage in the prior year. The licensee would keep a record of its
offers to the public for response, the representative programming that was devoted
to each issue, the partisan spokespersons presented, and the source and time of the
broadcasts. Normal news coverage would be excluded. The list would be retained
by the licensee, made available to the public, and submitted to the Commission as
part of the licensee's renewal application. 1979 Remand, supra note 124, at para. 4.
158. A member of the Washington Center for Public Policy Research.
159. 1987 Fairness Report, supra note 5, at paras. 63-88.
160. 1974 Fairness Report, supra note 11, at para. 78; 1976 Reconsideration, supra
note 40, at para. 33; 1979 Remand, supra note 124, at para. 24; 1987 Fairness Report,
supra note 5, at para. 88.
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duce both the complexity of FCC regulation under the Fair-
ness Doctrine and the vagueness from which the Doctrine
suffers. It would also limit the wide discretion the FCC pos-
sessed in enforcing the Fairness Doctrine, leaving the broad-
caster free to provide additional programming on controversial
issues. Finally, mandatory access would allow the public to
discuss controversial issues that may have been overlooked by
the broadcaster and would permit sharper discussion of issues,
because views would be presented directly by partisans rather
than by a broadcaster.
Mandatory access plans also have disadvantages. For exam-
ple, a system of paid access would favor the wealthy, while a
system of free access may penalize the broadcaster monetarily
or force the government to subsidize the program. In holding
that neither the Communications Act nor the first amend-
ment guarantees individuals a right of access, the United
States Supreme Court, in CBS v. Democratic National Com-
mittee,161 stated that even with a first-come-first-served sys-
tem of access, "the views of the affluent could well prevail
over those of others, since they would have it within their
power to purchase time more frequently." 62
Also, because an access plan would offer individuals the op-
portunity to broadcast their views directly, it might draw more
people than can be heard in the time available for discussion.
If this happened, the FCC "would be required to oversee far
more of the day-to-day operations of broadcasters' conduct, de-
ciding such questions as whether a particular individual or
group has had sufficient opportunity to present its viewpoint
and whether a particular viewpoint has already been
sufficiently aired.'16 3 Such extensive involvement by the FCC
in broadcasters' day-to-day programming would seriously in-
fringe upon broadcasters' journalistic freedoms, and would,
therefore, fail part two of the Fair Treatment Test.
161. 412 U.S. 94 (1973). The Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals which, in Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, held that a
flat ban on paid public issue announcements by broadcast licensees violated the first
amendment rights of viewers, at least where other sorts of paid announcements
were accepted. 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
162. 412 U.S. at 123. The Commission's holding in In re Request for Declaratory
Ruling and Complaint of National Conservative Political Action Committee reiter-
ated the Court's CBS holding denying mandatory access for anyone but federal can-
didates. 89 F.C.C.2d 626, para. 5 (1982), petition for review dismissed, No. 92-1579
(D.C. Cir. Sept. 14, 1982).
163. 412 U.S. at 127.
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An alternative to this type of government involvement
would be access on a first-come-first-served basis, or access by
lot or drawing. This system, which can be referred to as ran-
dom access, necessarily places decisions for program content in
the hands of viewers, and would not ensure timely discussion
of the most important issues, because the partisan, and not the
licensee, would control the choice of issues. The FCC, in re-
jecting a random access system in its 1974 Fairness Report,
pointed out the Supreme Court's observation in CBS that
"[t]he public interest would no longer be paramount, but,
rather, subordinate to private whim especially since .. .a
broadcaster would be largely precluded from rejecting edito-
rial advertisements that dealt with matters trivial or insignifi-
cant or already fairly covered by the broadcaster."1 This
would prevent the audience from receiving a diversity of views
on controversial issues and would violate part one of the Fair
Treatment Test.
A random access system would also reduce broadcaster dis-
cretion over topics, speakers and quality of programs, consti-
tuting "a further erosion of the journalistic discretion of
broadcasters in the coverage of public issues, and a transfer of
control over the treatment of public issues from the licensees
•.. to private individuals .. ',16' This violates part two of the
Fair Treatment Test.
Any mandatory access variation would, therefore, fail the
Fair Treatment Test. Furthermore, a mandatory access propo-
sal may violate the Communications Act, which prohibits
treating broadcasters as common carriers.166 In striking down
an FCC rule requiring cable systems to provide community ac-
cess channels, the Supreme Court, in FCC v. Midwest Video
Corporation, stated that "[i]t is difficult to deny, then, that
forcing broadcasters to develop a 'nondiscriminatory system
for controlling access ... is precisely what Congress intended
to avoid through section 3(h) of the Act.' 1167 The mandatory
access plan does not seem to be a viable alternative to the
Fairness Doctrine.
164. 1974 Fairness Report, supra note 11, at 29 n.29 (quoting CBS, 412 U.S. at 124).
165. CBS, 412 U.S. at 124.
166. Communications Act of 1934, § 3(h) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1987)).
167. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 705 (1979) (quoting CBS, 412 U.S.
at 140 n.9 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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B. Alternative Two: Treat Broadcasters as Common Carriers
As noted, section 3(h) of the Communications Act prohibits
treating broadcasters as common carriers. 168 The Supreme
Court confirmed this prohibition in FCC v. Midwest Video
Corporation, holding that "[t]he Commission may not regulate
cable systems as common carriers, just as it may not impose
such obligations on television broadcasters.'169 This alterna-
tive, therefore, requires amendment of the Communications
Act by Congress.
The common carrier alternative requires broadcasters to ac-
cept all programming offered to the station. 7 0 AT&T at-
tempted a common carrier system of broadcasting in the early
1920's. AT&T did not intend to create any programming, but
rather to build a transmitter and studios in every city and
make them available, for a fee, to whomever wished to use
them. The experiment failed because, at the time, the ex-
istence of few radios in American homes meant little incentive
existed for anyone to buy and program airtime.17 1 AT&T left
the broadcasting industry in 1926, selling its experimental tele-
vision station, WEAF in New York, to RCA. Moreover, fears
of an AT&T broadcasting monopoly similar to its telephone
monopoly were so great in 1927 and 1934 that Congress specifi-
cally rejected a common carrier approach to broadcasting. 7 2
Telephone companies can be treated as common carriers be-
cause they have the capacity to handle as many calls as cus-
tomers wish to place on most occasions. 173  The lure of
broadcasting personal views without censorship might attract
more would-be broadcasters than broadcast stations could han-
dle. 74 The FCC would need to intervene to decide which ap-
plicants would get their five minutes time, resulting in an
even greater supervisory role for the Commission.
Unlike a mandatory access system, which sets aside a dis-
168. 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1987). The Court indicated in CBS that such action is also
contrary to congressional intent beginning with the enactment of the Radio Act of
1927. 412 U.S. at 105.
169. 440 U.S. 689, 708-09 (1979) (emphasis added).
170. Broadcasters would be required "to serve all on equal terms without discrim-
ination." I. POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 2 (1983).
171. Id at 35.
172. Id. at 136-37.
173. Admittedly, this statement ignores difficulties in making calls on certain
holidays.
174. 1974 Fairness Report, supra note 11, at para. 7.
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crete period of time for partisans, the common carrier ap-
proach turns the entire broadcast day over to partisans. It is
not clear how this system would be funded. As with a
mandatory access system, a system of paid access favors the
wealthy, while a system of free access forces the broadcaster
or the government to subsidize programming. This system de-
prives broadcasters of all control over programming and does
not guarantee that controversial issues will be discussed.
Viewers might be treated to a potpourri of trivial and in-
significant issues of little or no relevance to the community.
In short, a common carrier system has all the problems of a
mandatory access system without the accompanying
advantages.
A common carrier plan would open up broadcast time to a
variety of people with differing views, but because the broad-
caster would have no control over the issues discussed, the
plan would not guarantee viewers access to programming on
issues of importance to the community.175 The common car-
rier plan, therefore, fails part one of the Fair Treatment Test.
It does not meet part two of the Test because it removes the
broadcaster's editorial control, placing it in the hands of
whichever partisans are chosen to present their views.
C. Alternative Three: Prong One Enforcement
The lack of enforcement of prong one of the Doctrine, 7 '
combined with the heavy threat of enforcement under prong
two, resulted in lack of compliance with prong one. A broad-
caster risked an expensive and time-consuming Fairness Doc-
trine fight every time she attempted to comply with prong two
of the Doctrine by providing coverage of a truly controversial
issue. Because prong one was rarely enforced, it was easier
and less expensive to limit or avoid controversial issues alto-
gether. Instead of providing balanced coverage of controver-
sial issues of public importance, broadcasters provided little
coverage, balanced or unbalanced, of such issues. Elimination
of prong two of the Doctrine and stronger enforcement of
prong one would require broadcasters to provide greater cov-
erage of controversial issues of importance to the broadcaster's
175. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
176. "[T]he threshold which triggers the second fairness obligation is lower than
that which triggers the first." Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 567
F.2d 1095, 1100 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 926 (1978).
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community but would not require them to provide coverage of
all sides of those issues. Lessening the chilling effect caused
by the constant threat of challenges under prong two of the
Fairness Doctrine should result in increased broadcaster will-
ingness to air programming on controversial issues of public
importance, resulting in benefit to viewers. Thus, part one of
the Fair Treatment Test would be met.
The prong one enforcement approach is not without defect.
A broadcaster could use her license to air personal views with-
out providing the community with a multiplicity of views on
controversial issues. However, the code of journalistic ethics,
subscribed to by both broadcast and print journalists, does im-
pose a duty to provide balanced coverage. 7
The prong one enforcement alternative does not increase
the likelihood that viewers will have access to a wide variety
of views on controversial issues from any single broadcaster.
However, currently, there are so many different electronic
media-radio, television, cable, satellite-in addition to the
print media, that the viewer is virtually assured a broad range
of views on controversial issues of public importance.178
Removing from the FCC the power to determine whether a
particular station has provided balanced coverage of an issue
enhances the broadcaster's editorial discretion.19 However, in
the absence of a requirement of balanced coverage, complain-
ants might "transform their complaints to accusations of
broadcaster failure to cover particular issues adequately.' 8 0
As a result, there might be increased litigation over prong one
of the Doctrine. Strengthening enforcement of prong one will
necessitate increased FCC supervision to determine whether
177. See CODE OF BROADCAST NEWS ETHICS OF THE RADIO TELEVISION NEWS DI-
RECTORS ASSOCIATION (1988) (stating that the members will "[s]trive to present the
source or nature of broadcast news material in a way that is balanced, accurate and
fair"); CODE OF ETHICS OF THE SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS/SIGMA
DELTA CHI (1973) (observing that "[n]ews reports should be free of opinion or bias
and represent all sides of an issue").
178. Crossownership of different types of broadcast stations and nonbroadcast
media in the same market weakens this argument. To the extent that the various
media in a particular market are owned and operated by the same people, it is less
likely that the receiver will have access to a diversity of viewpoints. See iqfra notes
208-32 and accompanying text.
179. On the other hand, strengthening enforcement of prong one without elimi-
nating prong two would increase FCC intrusion into the editorial discretion of
broadcasters.
180. 1987 Fairness Report, supra note 5, at para. 130 n.125 (comments of CBS).
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broadcasters cover controversial issues. The FCC could then
tell a licensee what to broadcast if it decided that the licensee
had not adequately covered an issue the Commission deemed
controversial. Broadcasters would not exercise full editorial
discretion, and this alternative would, therefore, fall short of
part two of the Fair Treatment Test.
D. Alternative Four: Small Market Enforcement
Under the small market enforcement alternative, the Fair-
ness Doctrine would be enforced in small markets but elimi-
nated in those media markets exceeding a set number of
outlets."'1 The market's media could include all information
sources-including print media-or be limited to a smaller
subset, for instance, all radio and television stations or all ra-
dio, television and cable stations.18 2
In a 1975 speech to the International Radio & Television So-
ciety and in the Commission's 1976 Reconsideration of the 1974
Fairness Report, former FCC Chairman Richard E. Wiley
urged abandoning the Fairness Doctrine in the larger radio
markets." 3 The Commission rejected the proposal for an ex-
perimental moratorium.1 8 4
A small market enforcement alternative would eliminate in-
trusive governmental regulation in those markets with a suffi-
ciently large number of media outlets to ensure that viewers
receive a diversity of views from the variety of media outlets
serving the market.
The alternative also recognizes that people obtain their in-
formation about public issues from a variety of sources, includ-
ing print, broadcast and nonbroadcast video media. The small
market alternative could be applied to all broadcast and
nonbroadcast video media, just broadcast media, or just radio
or television. Under the latter application, the alternative
would ensure a diversity of views, even for those people who
receive all their information from television alone.
The major disadvantage of the small market enforcement
181. The Commission would have to establish a number qualifying a market as
"small."
182. The late Senator Sam Ervin advocated this proposal. See 119 CONG. REC.
37,047 (1973) (statement of Sen. Ervin).
183. 58 F.C.C.2d 691, 700-01 (1976) (separate statement of Chairman Richard E.
Wiley).
184. Id. at 699 n.11.
[Vol. 11:291
1989] ALTERNATIVES TO THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE 321
alternative proposal is that limiting its application to small
markets would result in unequal treatment of broadcasters
based solely on the size of the market served. It would, how-
ever, maximize the editorial freedom and first amendment
rights of large market broadcasters. At the same time, access
by viewers to a wide variety of views on controversial issues is
not reduced. Thus, part one and part two of the Fair Treat-
ment Test are met. However, leaving the Fairness Doctrine in
force in smaller markets fails the Test, just as a fully enforced
Fairness Doctrine does.
E. Alternative Five: Television Enforcement
Under the television enforcement alternative, the Fairness
Doctrine would be applied only to television stations (in all
markets) on the theory that television has an overwhelming
impact on the community. 185 Radio stations would be freed
from the burdens of regulation and supervision. 8 6 This alter-
native would remove intrusive governmental intervention in
the editorial functions of radio stations, a medium with a suffi-
cient number and diversity of broadcasters to assure coverage
of all sides of controversial issues.8 7
The television enforcement alternative, therefore, meets the
Fair Treatment Test to the extent it eliminates the Fairness
Doctrine from one segment of broadcasting. It fails the Test,
however, with regard to television broadcasters, because they
would be subject to all the previously enforced burdens of the
Fairness Doctrine. A few media markets still receive only a
few radio channels. However, even small broadcast markets
185. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text (discussing impact theory).
186. Former FCC Chairman Richard E. Wiley advocated limiting enforcement of
the doctrine to television in the 1976 Reconsideration, supra note 40, at 700 (state-
ment of Chairman Wiley).
187. The following figures demonstrate the tremendous growth in numbers of ra-
dio stations (* indicates data not available):
1950 1970 1983
Total 2,867 6,889 9,282
Standard (AM) 2,086 4,292 4,723
AM Commercial * 4,267 4,679
AM Educational * 25 44
FM 781 2,597 4,559
FM Commercial 733 2,184 3,458
FM Educational 48 413 1,101
1984 Notice of Inquiry, supra note 116, at para 34.
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have ever-increasing access to cable and satellite television
viewing.1as
F. Alternative Six: Marketwide Approach
The marketwide approach alternative relies on other media
in a market to balance the presentation of controversial issues
of public importance. The FCC would allow licensees to re-
spond to complaints by showing that coverage of the issue was
balanced within the entire market, despite the imbalance in
that particular licensee's coverage. 18 9 The FCC rejected this
approach in a 1958 proceeding."9 In its 1964 Fairness Re-
port '9 and 1974 Fairness Report, 92 the Commission reiterated
its position that a licensee must satisfy its Fairness Doctrine
obligations with its own broadcasting, relying on neither other
broadcasting stations nor other media. The Commission stated
that requiring each station to provide contrasting views would
increase the chance that viewers would be exposed to a full
discussion of controversial issues. 93
This alternative recognizes that people obtain information
on controversial issues from many sources. 94 Former FCC
Commissioner Glenn 0. Robinson argued that the rationale of
the Fairness Doctrine did not withstand scrutiny if the Com-
mission did not consider whether the public received a diver-
sity of views from the media taken as a whole. Professor
Robinson argued:
If the right of the public to receive diverse and balanced view-
points is the decisive desideratum, it is curious, to say the
least, that the Commission purposely insists on ignoring the
question of whether the public is in fact receiving diverse and
balanced presentations from existing communications media
as a whole. 95
In 1983, former FCC Chairman Charles Ferris and L. Greg-
ory Ballard argued that cable and other emerging video
188. See supra notes 129 and 132-34 and accompanying text.
189. The burden of proving that coverage was balanced within the entire market
would be on the licensee.
190. Letter to WSOC Broadcasting Co., 40 F.C.C. 468 (1958).
191. 1964 Fairness Primer, supra note 11, at para. 11.
192. 1974 Fairness Report, supra note 11, at para. 28.
193. Id. However, as the FCC retreats from enforcement of the Fairness Doc-
trine, this objection may no longer carry much force.
194. See supra notes 129-39 and accompanying text.
195. Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment: Observations on 40. Years of
Radio and Television Regulation, 52 MINN. L. REV. 67, 143 (1967).
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sources did not yet offer sufficient additional "diverse, self-
generated informational programming to wean the American
public from its dependence for information on the three com-
mercial networks. ' 196 Today, the viewing shares of the three
major national networks are dropping, and millions of viewers
receive their information from other sources, such as the Mac-
Neil-Lehrer News Hour, Cable News Network (CNN), C-
Span, and independent broadcasting and cable stations. Pro-
fessor Donald Lively argues persuasively that all media in a
market should be considered as a whole because "[e]ven if a
particular medium does not provide fair coverage.., most in-
dividuals are exposed to multiple sources of information that
compete and balance one another."1 7
The marketwide approach to enforcement is consistent with
current FCC practice allowing broadcasters to rely on the pro-
gramming of other stations in the market to fulfill other obli-
gations. For instance, in determining how to meet the needs
of their audience with regard to issue responsive program-
ming,198 broadcasters may rely on the ascertainment records of
other broadcasters within their market. 99
This alternative poses problems of administration and en-
forcement.200 Broadcasters and the FCC would have to obtain
records of all media sources in a market to determine the ex-
tent of coverage on a particular issue. This alternative is
somewhat less intrusive on broadcasters' editorial discretion
than the Fairness Doctrine because broadcasters would be able
to rely on other media for balancing views.
The marketwide approach alternative meets the first part of
the Fair Treatment Test because the multiplicity of media out-
lets in the market provides viewers with a diversity of views
on controversial issues. However, this alternative does not
maximize the editorial freedom of broadcasters because their
programming decisions would be subject to review and correc-
196. Ferris & Ballard, Independent Political Action Groups: New Life for the
Fairness Doctrine, 36 VAND. L. REV. 929, 945 (1983).
197. If all media in a market are examined collectively, rather than being treated
in isolation, "[t]he quality of first amendment results thus would be enhanced to the
extent analysis was calibrated toward the media collectively rather than specifi-
cally." Lively, supra note 140, at 972.
198. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
199. Radio Deregulation, supra note 107, at para. 34 n.32.
200. 1974 Fairness Report, supra note 11, at para. 28.
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tion by the FCC, thereby failing part two of the Test.2 1' Fi-
nally, if it is determined that overall coverage of an issue is
not balanced in a given market, the method by which the FCC
would determine which stations would need to air program-
ming to obtain the desired balance is unclear." 2
G. Alternative Seven: Enforcement Moratorium
The FCC's elimination of the Fairness Doctrine has created
a de facto moratorium on enforcement of fairness-type com-
plaints. A de jure moratorium would differ because broadcast-
ers could anticipate the date of the moratorium's termination.
Alfred Sikes, head of the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration, recently called for a five-year
test of complete content deregulation of radio, including the
Fairness Doctrine and its remnants. Sikes claims that such a
test "would provide an objective basis on which lawmakers
could determine whether television should also be deregulated
or whether radio should be 're-regulated.' "203
A moratorium would provide an opportunity to test the effi-
cacy and necessity of the Fairness Doctrine. 204 A moratorium
with an automatic expiration, short of outright reimposition of
the Doctrine, may even be supported by some proponents of
the Fairness Doctrine as an opportunity to test the need for
the Doctrine. It would create no new regulatory burdens for
broadcasters or the FCC. In a compromise effort, Congress
could codify the Doctrine, but impose a moratorium by delay-
ing the effective date.
Knowing that the moratorium would be temporary, how-
ever, might skew broadcasters' actions and undermine the test
results. Additionally, the amount of administrative review
necessary to adequately evaluate such an experiment would
require even greater governmental oversight than existed
under the Fairness Doctrine.
A moratorium would, therefore, fail the second part of the
201. However, such review presumably would arise less frequently than it would
under the Fairness Doctrine as previously enforced.
202. The FCC raised this as an objection in rejecting the proposal in its 1974 Fair-
ness Report, supra note 11, at para. 28.
203. Radio Plays to a New Record in Washington, BROADCASTING, Sept. 19, 1988,
at 45-46.
204. Former FCC Chairman Richard Wiley advocated an experimental morato-
rium on enforcement in larger markets for this reason. 1976 Reconsideration, supra
note 40, at 700-01 (statement of Chairman Wiley).
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Fair Treatment Test, with no guarantee that it would meet
the first part of the Test because of broadcaster uncertainty
over its temporary nature.
H. Alternative Eight: Free Market Approach
Under the free market approach, all content and structural
regulations that presently exist, with the exception of anti-
trust laws, would be eliminated, and the broadcast media
would be treated in the same manner as are the print me-
dia.2 °5 This alternative guarantees broadcasters' first amend-
ment rights by providing the same editorial discretion
newspaper publishers enjoy. The chilling effect of govern-
mental supervision would be eliminated, and broadcasters
would be free to provide coverage of controversial issues, with-
out fear of complaint from individuals who disagree with the
views broadcast, subject only to the dictates of the
marketplace.
The chief disadvantage of the market approach is that it
eliminates the ability of the FCC to ensure that coverage of
controversial issues is comprehensive and balanced. However,
viewers who are dissatisfied with the quality of certain pro-
gramming can simply "vote with the remote" and change the
channel, thereby ensuring that programming will meet the
needs of the community.2 0° Broadcasters will have to provide
the coverage their audiences desire or lose them.
The print media are given freedom to publish what they
choose, 0 7 subject only to the confines of whatever journalistic
code of ethics they follow and their readers' faith that contro-
versial issues are fairly covered. Different treatment for
broadcasters may stem from the questionable proposition that
they are less scrupulous or less capable than print journalists.
One danger in the free market approach is the possibility
that, lacking economic regulation other than antitrust laws,
one individual, or several collectively, could obtain a control-
ling percentage of the media outlets in a market, thereby
thwarting the goal of diverse media viewpoints. This result
would violate part one of the Fair Treatment Test.
205. See generally, Fowler & Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Reg-
ulation, 60 TEx. L. REV. 207 (1982).
206. A "remote" refers to a remote control unit for a television.
207. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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IV
The Preferred Alternative: A Structural
Approach
The structural approach seeks to promote diversity of view-
points through non-content-based regulations. 0 Under this
alternative, instead of regulating program content, the FCC
would severely limit the number of broadcast stations a single
licensee could own. The FCC's current structural regulations
consist of duopoly and one-to-a-market rules, multiple owner-
ship rules, and crossownership rules.
Under the original duopoly rule, individuals were limited to
one license in a single service area. Because AM radio, FM
radio, and television were defined as different service areas,
licensees could own one of each in a market. Under the origi-
nal one-to-a-market rule, established in 1970, licensees were
limited to one broadcast station in any market, regardless of
the type of broadcast service involved.0 9 The FCC viewed this
as a logical extension of the duopoly rules.210 However, the
1970 rules did not contain a firm ban against radio-UHF com-
binations because UHF stations were weak and the Commis-
sion felt that few would go on the air unless affiliated with an
established radio station.211 The Commission decided to re-
view radio-UHF combinations on a case-by-case basis.21 2 The
rules were prospective only because of concern that requiring
divestiture would result in instability.2 3 On reconsideration,
the Commission modified the rules to permit AM-FM combi-
nations, because it believed that continued development of FM
radio required the financial stability that such combinations
would provide.214 As a result of these exceptions, the rules
flatly banned only VHF-radio combinations.
The current multiple ownership rules, as amended in 1985,
limit the number of broadcast licenses any single individual
208. Bazelon, The First Amendment and the "New Media"--New Directions in
Regulating Telecommunications, 31 FED. COMM. L.J. 201, 206 (1979).
209. In re Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73.240, and 73.636 of the Commission
Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and Television Broadcast
Stations, Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.2d 306 (1970), recon. granted in part, denied in
part, 28 F.C.C.2d 662 (1971) [hereinafter Multiple Ownership Rules I].
210. 22 F.C.C.2d at para. 21.
211. Id. at paras. 45-47.
212. Id. at para. 47.
213. Id. at paras. 48, 65.
214. Multiple Ownership Rules I, supra note 209, at paras. 35-37.
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can own. Under the FCC's 12-12-12 multiple ownership rules,
no individual may own any interest in more than twelve AM,
twelve FM, and twelve television stations nationwide.215 Simi-
larly, no individual can own an interest in stations which have
an aggregate national audience exceeding twenty-five
percent.1
Current crossownership rules, as amended in 1975,217 pro-
hibit owning a daily newspaper and a broadcast station in the
same market.218  The 1975 amendment eliminated the radio-
UHF exception to the duopoly rules219 and required divesti-
ture by 1980 of newspaper-broadcast combinations.22 ° In addi-
tion, the Communications Act prohibits cable operators from
owning broadcast stations in the area they serve.221
A structural approach to fairness regulation should tighten
crossownership restrictions and prohibit licensees from own-
ing more than one broadcast station of any type in a single
market, or from owning any other major media source in the
same market. These restrictions would have to be strictly en-
forced, with no exemptions.2
215. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d)(1)(i)-(ii) (1986). The previous limit of 7-7-7 was in-
creased to 12-12-12 in 1985. Amendment to § 73.3555 of the Commission's Rules Re-
lating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, 100
F.C.C.2d 74, App. a (1985). For an interesting alternative to the FCC amendment,
see Note, An Alternative Proposal to the FCC's Proposed Amendment: Broadcast Me-
dia Concentration Rules, 14 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 399 (1984).
216. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d)(2)(i)-(ii) (1986).
217. In re Amendment of Sections 73.34, 73.240, and 73.636 of the Commission's
Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and Television Broadcast
Stations, Second Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046 (1975) [hereinafter Multiple
Ownership Rules II], off'd, FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S.
775 (1978).
218. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(e) (1986).
219. Multiple Ownership Rules II, supra note 217, at para. 107.
220. An exception was provided for newspaper-radio combinations in communi-
ties served by a separately owned television station. Id. at paras. 108-22.
221. 47 U.S.C. § 533(a) (1988); 47 C.F.R. § 76.501 (1986).
222. Language inserted into the Fiscal Year 1987 Continuing Resolution by Sena-
tor Ernest Hollings (Dem-SC) at the request of Senator Edward Kennedy (Dem-
MA) blocked the FCC from taking steps to repeal or modify the television-newspa-
per crossownership ban, and prohibited the FCC from granting waivers or exten-
sions of waivers to the ban. See Continuing Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-202, 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (101 Stat.) 1329. The lan-
guage, slipped into the omnibus spending bill on December 21, 1987, just before it
was passed and sent to the President, was aimed specifically at Rupert Murdoch,
who owns both a television station and a newspaper in Boston and New York. Cur-
rent waivers expired during the next six months, and would have forced Murdoch to
sell either the Boston Herald or WFXT-TV in Boston by June 30, 1988, and either
the New York Post or WNYW-TV in New York by March 6, 1988. See Hollings,
1989]
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This alternative would increase the number of broadcast
owners and thereby increase the diversity of programming
without the intrusiveness of content regulations such as the
Fairness Doctrine. Professor Tom Collins argues that FCC
regulations have increased the diversity of ownership in the
broadcast industry, but questions whether they have increased
the diversity of views.22 His point is well taken. For a struc-
tural approach to effectively increase the diversity of views
and information broadcast, it must nurture a diversity in
broadcast ownership which may or may not currently exist.
Achieving such diversity may require a re-examination and
expansion of the FCC's minority preference rules, to en-
courage greater participation in the broadcast industry of peo-
ple traditionally underrepresented. Minority preference rules
are a separate topic beyond the scope of this Note. Suffice it
to say that a structural approach to regulation will benefit
from any Commission action which results in greater broad-
cast ownership by previously underrepresented communities.
The structural approach has certain disadvantages. First, it
limits all broadcasters on the basis of how many stations they
own, rather than on the basis of the diversity and quality of
their programming; second, some financially troubled newspa-
pers can continue only if subsidized by a profitable business
which, in many cases, would be a broadcast station. Such is
the case with a money-losing New York Post and a profitable
WNYW-TV, both owned by Robert Murdoch in New York.
A third objection to the structural approach is that the
FCC's multiple ownership rules may actually reduce diversity
of program and service viewpoints. Because they prohibit
broadcasters from owning large groups of stations, the multi-
ple ownership rules deny broadcasters the cost savings gener-
ated by producing programming for a large number of
stations, as the three major networks are able to do. The in-
ability to accumulate a large number of stations under single
ownership hampers the development of additional major na-
Kennedy Stir Up Hornet's Nest Over Crossownership, BROADCASTING, Jan. 11, 1988,
at 42. The prohibition on extension of temporary waivers was struck down in News
Am. Publishing v. FCC, 844 F.2d 800 (D.C. Cir. 1988). While it is difficult to extend
much sympathy to a media giant like Rupert Murdoch, this episode illustrates what
government can do when it disagrees with the political viewpoint of a broadcaster.
223. Collins, Has the First Amendment Arrived for Broadcasting? (Book Review),
66 TEx. L. REV. 453, 464 (1987).
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tional networks.224 The FCC's 1985 amendment liberalizing its
multiple ownership rules is predicated in part on this belief.2 '
The Commission stated at that time that its ultimate goal was
reduction of the multiple ownership rules "to the maximum
extent feasible." 226
Liberalizing the multiple ownership rules is not inconsistent
with a structural approach to the Fairness Doctrine. As long
as no individual can own more than one broadcast station
within a media market, the number of stations any one indi-
vidual owns nationwide should not affect the diversity of
programming available to a viewer. However, more restrictive
mulitple ownership rules, to the extent that they limit total
ownership, should increase opportunities for underrep-
resented groups to enter broadcast ownership.
Professor Rossini argues that rules imposing structural limi-
tations should be "simple to understand and inexpensive to ad-
minister. ' 227 Strict limits on ownership within markets would
be simple and would avoid the potential danger under the
market approach of a monopoly of the medium within a mar-
ket. The escalating prices of broadcast stations indicate a
strong demand for them, something which was not true for
FM radio stations and VHF television stations in the past.
Limiting broadcasters to one station per market and requiring
224. See Amendment of Rules Limiting Multiple Ownership of AM, FM, and Tel-
evision Broadcast Stations, 48 Fed. Reg. 49,438, 49,446 (1983) (to be codified at 47
C.F.R. §§ 73.34, 73.240, 73.636) (proposed Sept. 22, 1983) [hereinafter Multiple Owner-
ship Notice]. See also In re Application of Combined Communications Corp., 72
F.C.C.2d 637, para. 42 (1979) (financial health of media chain may encourage initia-
tive and risk taking in news reports, diminish concern for sponsor reaction, facilitate
challenges to local parochial views, and provide a major media source to compete
with national news media); Lively, supra note 140, at 975.
The recent success of the fledgling Fox Network indicates that there is potential
for the rise of additional networks. While the multiple ownership rules also apply to
the networks and limit the number of stations they can own to 12 AM, 12 FM and 12
TV, it is important to note that the networks developed in the early days of televi-
sion, when conditions enabled them to obtain a firm lock on programming, which
they are only now losing, 40 years later. A broadcaster attempting to form a na-
tional network under current multiple ownership rules has direct control over only
12 television stations. Additional stations must be brought within the network by
means of network agreements. In addition, the predominance of the three major
networks makes formation difficult, as evidenced by the 40-year domination of tele-
vision by ABC, NBC, and CBS.
225. Multiple Ownership Notice, supra note 224, at 49,446.
226. Id. at 49,451.
227. Rossini, The Spectrum Scarcity Doctrine: A Constitutional Anachronism, 39
Sw. L.J. 827, 840 (1985).
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divestiture of multiple media outlets in a market, including
major newspapers, will not leave some stations to fail. Where
the FCC once found it necessary to prop up FM stations, FM
now dominates the radio markets. And, where the Commis-
sion once feared for the survival of UHF stations, the stations
are now coming into their own as profitable enterprises.
There is no economic necessity for the FCC to allow a single
broadcaster to own multiple stations in a market in order to
ensure their survival.
FCC Chairman Dennis Patrick has proposed a relaxation of
the duopoly and one-to-a-market rules.228 Patrick's advocacy
of economic deregulation misses the mark: the primary target
of deregulatory efforts should be content controls on broad-
casters. Regulation of electronic media should avoid content
regulation, consistent with the first amendment, and, in ex-
change, the broadcasting industry should be willing to accept
some economic regulation.
In its 1983 notice to change the multiple ownership rules,22
the Commission indicated its desire to eliminate all structural
limits on broadcast ownership230 and, instead, leave economic
regulation of the broadcast industry to enforcement of the an-
titrust laws by the Federal Trade Commission and the Depart-
ment of Justice.21 The Commission declined the elimination
of its structural regulations in favor of relaxed multiple own-
ership limitations. In light of the current lax antitrust en-
forcement policies of those agencies, limiting economic
regulation of the broadcast industry to antitrust law amounts
to no economic regulation at all.
A recent Note argued that antitrust laws are an inadequate
source of structural regulation.232 The author advocated regu-
lations that would limit network affiliation with VHF televi-
sion stations, maintain VHF station ownership limits at five
(increased by the FCC to twelve), and expand UHF ownership
limits to a significant enough percentage of markets needed
for developing and maintaining a national network. These
228. Radio Plays to a New Record in Washington, BROADCASTING, Sept. 19, 1988,
at 44.
229. Multiple Ownership Notice, supra note 224, at 49,451.
230. Id. at 49,447.
231. Id. at 49,446-47.
232. Note, supra note 215, at 417.
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proposals go toward national limits on ownership, which are
reflected in the multiple ownership regulations.
If fully implemented as outlined above, the structural ap-
proach should expand the diversity of broadcast ownership
and programming, meeting part one of the Fair Treatment
Test. The structural approach also meets part two of the Test
because it eschews content controls for economic regulation,
leaving broadcasters in control of their programming.
Conclusion
Until August of 1987, the FCC enforced the Fairness Doc-
trine as though each broadcast station was an island, rather
than a player in a complex media market composed of a pano-
ply of news and information sources. The Fairness Doctrine is
a content regulation, making it immediately suspect under the
first amendment freedom of speech clause. The FCC has abol-
ished the general applicability of the Doctrine.33
Entering what could be a new era in broadcast regulation,
the FCC has an opportunity to throw out the old standards
and develop new ones. These new standards should require
both protection of viewer interests in diversity (the con-
stitutional requirement of Red Lion) and full protection for
the editorial independence of broadcasters. If the media mar-
ketplace is viewed as a marketplace of ideas, made up of many
diverse media sources, the search for an alternative to the
Fairness Doctrine that guarantees full first amendment rights
for both viewers and broadcasters will be an easier one.
A useful tool to employ in this search is a Fair Treatment
Test, against which all alternatives should be measured.
Under the Test, the alternative in question must ensure that
1) the viewer will have access to a wide variety of viewpoints
on a wide variety of controversial issues of importance to the
community, and 2) the broadcaster will maintain editorial dis-
cretion and preclude the government from telling the broad-
caster what to broadcast.
Mandatory access proposals, including both limited direct
access and common carrier, fail both parts of the Fair Treat-
233. It is possible that the FCC will decide to keep certain aspects of the Fairness
Doctrine, such as the Personal Attack Rule and the Political Editorializing Rule, on
the grounds that they are narrowly tailored and serve a substantial governmental
interest. See supra notes 89-102 and accompanying text.
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ment Test because partisans of one side of an issue could mo-
nopolize the available programming time. The result would be
lack of diverse viewpoints on a particular issue and possibly a
lack of coverage of all but a few controversial issues.
Mandatory access proposals also fail because they remove edi-
torial decisionmaking from the broadcaster and place it in the
hands of those partisans given access and because they require
a heavy FCC role in deciding who goes on the air.
The prong one enforcement alternative should increase the
diversity of views available to viewers by removing the disin-
centive to broadcast programming on controversial issues.
With all media outlets in a market providing controversial is-
sue programming, viewers will have access to a variety of
views, meeting the first part of the Fair Treatment Test.
However, FCC oversight will shift to prong one of the Doc-
trine, and the resulting interference with editorial discretion
will violate the second part of the Test.
The small market enforcement alternative and the televi-
sion enforcement alternative meet the Test in that they elimi-
nate enforcement of the Doctrine for some markets or some
broadcasters. To the extent the Doctrine is enforced in some
markets or against some broadcasters, it fails the Test. The
Fairness Doctrine fails part one of the Fair Treatment Test
because its litigation, compliance and reputational costs pro-
vide a disincentive to broadcast programming on controversial
issues. Therefore, it does not ensure that viewers have access
to a diversity of views on a diversity of controversial issues. In
addition, because it allows the FCC to second-guess the pro-
gramming decisions of the broadcaster and order the
broadcaster to provide programming on particular issues, it in-
terferes with the broadcaster's editorial discretion and fails
part two of the Test.
The marketwide approach ensures a variety of views on con-
troversial issues. Thus, the first part of the Fair Treatment
Test is met. However, significant FCC oversight of licensee
broadcast decisions still remains, and, therefore, the second
part of the Test is not met.
The free market approach meets the Test because it elimi-
nates the Fairness Doctrine, thereby allowing broadcasters to
provide programming on controversial issues without fear of
FCC sanctions and leaving viewers free to support those media
outlets meeting their informational needs. An experimental
[Vol. 11:291
1989] ALTERNATIVES TO THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE 333
moratorium achieves the same objectives on a short term ba-
sis, but involves greater FCC monitoring of broadcaster per-
formance than presently exists. The free market approach
would fail part one of the Test if it resulted in a concentration
of media ownership within a market.
The structural approach meets part two of the Fair Treat-
ment Test because it eliminates content-based regulations (in-
cluding the Fairness Doctrine) and meets part one of the Test
because it guarantees a diversified media ownership within
markets.
Broadcasters and viewers are dependent on one another for
more than just news, entertainment and advertising dollars.
They depend on each other for full exercise of their first
amendment rights. A broadcaster under the ever-watchful
eye of a government agency does not feel free to provide the
diversity of views and programming viewers need to exercise
their first amendment rights. Viewers denied access to a di-
versity of views may eventually turn away from television and
radio, impairing the exercise of the first amendment rights of
both broadcaster and viewer.

